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Over the past decade, corporate law in India has undergone 
significant reforms with implications for not only corporate governance 
but also for questions about the purpose of the corporation and 
beneficiaries of the corporate form. Following years of debate and 
attempts at reforms that began in the late 1990s, India’s reform efforts 
culminated in the 2013 Companies Act (hereinafter the “Act” or the 
“Companies Act”).1 The Act has been described as “the single most 
important development in India’s history of corporate legislation” and a 
“watershed” event for corporate law reforms in the country.2 Much 
attention has been placed on specific aspects of the new Companies Act, 
such as the requirements that firms provide specific corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) disclosures or appoint independent directors.3 
In designing India’s new corporate law, policymakers grappled with 
the subject of corporate purpose and with determining which institutional 
structure could best further the purpose of the corporation. When viewed 
holistically, the Companies Act is a radical experiment with corporate 
purpose. The Companies Act does not specifically define corporate 
purpose, other than stating that a company may be formed for any “lawful 
                                                     
 1. See The Companies Act, No. 18 of 2013, INDIA CODE (2013) (India) [hereinafter Companies 
Act, 2013]. 
 2. Bala N. Balasubramanian, Strengthening Corporate Governance in India: A Review of 
Legislative and Regulatory Initiatives in 2013-2014, 2 (IIM Bangalore Research Paper No. 447, Jan. 
2014). 
 3. See generally Afra Afsharipour & Shruti Rana, The Emergence of New Corporate Social 
Responsibility Regimes in China and India, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 175 (2014) (discussing CSR 
requirements); Vikramaditya S. Khanna & Umakanth Varottil, Board Independence in India: From 
Form to Function?, in INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN ASIA: A HISTORICAL, CONTEXTUAL AND 
COMPARATIVE APPROACH (Harald Baum et al. eds., 2016) (discussing independent director 
requirements under the Companies Act). 
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purpose.”4 Nevertheless, the Act’s various provisions regarding a board’s 
fiduciary duties and responsibilities make clear that shareholder wealth 
maximization should no longer be the primary lens for decision-making 
by Indian boards. One of the most essential provisions of the Act declares 
that corporate directors “shall act in good faith in order to promote the 
objects of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in 
the best interests of the company, its employees, the shareholders, the 
community and for the protection of environment.”5 Moreover, the Act’s 
code for independent directors requires them to “safeguard the interests of 
all stakeholders” and to “balance the conflicting interest of the 
stakeholders.”6 These duty-focused provisions are bolstered by several 
other important provisions relating to CSR spending and disclosure and, 
in some cases, stakeholder access to board members.7 The substantive 
reforms of the Companies Act are then overlaid with an extensive 
disclosure regime that envisions a vast increase in corporate transparency. 
The Indian experiment with corporate purpose is worthy of analysis 
for several reasons. First, as the world’s largest democracy, legislative 
changes in India could have a significant impact on the lives of more than 
1.2 billion people living in the country.8 Second, as Indian companies 
become even larger global players, the corporate governance of Indian 
firms will have wide implications for many people outside of India. Third, 
India is an attractive country for global investors,9 and if the Indian 
experiment with more socially responsible firms succeeds, investors could 
be persuaded to push for similar reforms around the world. Fourth, the 
Indian experiment has been noticed and debated by stakeholders and 
commentators globally who hope to emulate India’s move toward 
corporations with legally mandated responsibilities to stakeholders 
beyond shareholders.10 
                                                     
 4. Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, § 3. 
 5. Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, § 166. 
 6. Companies Act, 2013, supra note 1, sch. IV, paras. II (5), (6). 
 7. See infra notes 97–125 and accompanying text. 
 8. See INDIA GLOBAL COMPETITIVENESS INDEX: 2016-2017 EDITION, WORLD ECONOMIC 
FORUM, http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-index/country-profiles/#economy=IND 
[https://perma.cc/7DRK-6NF9]. 
 9. See Sneha Shah & Baiju Kalesh, India is Among the Most Attractive Investment Destinations: 
Sri Rajan, Bain India, ECON. TIMES (July 20, 2015, 5:37 PM), http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ 
opinion/interviews/india-is-among-the-most-attractive-investment-destinations-sri-rajan-bain-
india/articleshow/48146026.cms [https://perma.cc/HV2W-QH62]. 
 10. See, e.g., Sandeep Gopalan & Akshaya Kamalnath, Mandatory Corporate Social 
Responsibility as a Vehicle for Reducing Inequality: An Indian Solution for Piketty and the 
Millennials, 10 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y. 34 (2015) (advocating for a model similar to India’s to be 
adopted in the U.S.); Jingchen Zhao, Promoting a More Efficient Corporate Governance Model in 
Emerging Markets Through Corporate Law, 15 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 447 (2016) 
(discussing India’s CSR model as a potential example for other emerging economies). 
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India’s new corporate law, in many ways, engages with debates in 
other parts of the world to redefine the purpose of the corporation. Given 
the large extent to which corporate law in India looks at comparative 
examples from other common law jurisdictions, this Article primarily 
focuses on comparative developments in the U.K. and U.S.11 In the U.K., 
for example, the concept of “enlightened shareholder value” was 
introduced through the passage of the U.K. Companies Act 2006.12 
Similarly, the U.S. has also been debating the purpose of the corporation 
and experimenting with different forms of business entities aimed at 
moving away from the claim that the law requires shareholder wealth 
maximization as the primary purpose of the corporation.13 In the U.S., the 
emergence of new types of business entities, such as the benefit 
corporation, clearly challenges long-held views that the purpose of the 
corporation is to maximize shareholder wealth.14 
There are many similarities between India’s 2013 Companies Act, 
the U.K.’s codification of directors’ duties, and the re-examination of 
corporate purpose within the movement toward benefit corporations in the 
U.S. Similar to the U.K. approach, India has codified directors’ duties in 
the 2013 Companies Act. Like the U.S. benefit corporations approach, 
India’s legislative changes extend beyond codification of directors’ duties. 
                                                     
 11. For a discussion of U.S. and U.K. influences on Indian corporate law, see generally Afra 
Afsharipour, Corporate Governance Convergence: Lessons from the Indian Experience, 29 NW. J. 
INT’L L. & BUS. 335 (2009) [hereinafter Afsharipour, Corporate Governance Convergence]; 
Umakanth Varottil, The Evolution of Corporate Law in Post-Colonial India: From Transplant to 
Autochthony, 31 AM. U. INT’L. L. REV. 253 (2016) [hereinafter Varottil, Evolution of Corporate Law]. 
 12. For a detailed comparison of the U.K.’s ESV framework and Section 166(2) of the India’s 
Companies Act, 2013, see Mihir Naniwadekar & Umakanth Varottil, The Stakeholder Approach 
Towards Directors’ Duties Under Indian Company Law: A Comparative Analysis, (NUS - Centre for 
Law & Business, Working Paper No. 16/03, Aug. 11, 2016). 
 13. See generally J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with Profit: Governance, 
Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2011). For an overview of the many different types of new business entities 
that have arisen since the mid-2000s, see J. Haskell Murray, State Laboratories and Social Enterprise 
Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PARTNERSHIPS, LLC AND ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS (Robert W. Hillman & Mark J. Loewenstein eds., 2015). For debates about this 
claim, compare Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear Eyed Understanding 
of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 
50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761 (2015), and J. Travis Laster & John Mark Zeberkiewicz, The Rights 
and Duties of Blockholder Directors, 70 BUS. LAW. 33 (2014), with LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER 
VALUE MYTH (2012), and Lyman Johnson, Law and Legal Theory in the History of Corporate 
Responsibility: Corporate Personhood, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1135 (2012). 
 14. See Lyman Johnson, Law and the History of Corporate Responsibilities: Corporate 
Governance, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 974, 990 (2013) [hereinafter Johnson, Law and the History of 
Corporate Responsibilities] (describing benefit corporations as an “avowed rejection of a strict and 
exclusive focus on investor welfare [that] expressly permit corporate directors to craft corporate 
strategy in a way that both benefits investors and advances a larger general or specific social and 
environmental purpose”). 
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India’s move toward a broader purpose for the corporation, much like the 
move toward benefit corporations in the U.S., flies in the face of long-
standing beliefs that corporations “are incapable of having social or moral 
obligations.”15 Like the benefit corporation model in the U.S., profit 
maximization is no longer clearly the primary lens in decision-making by 
Indian boards. Instead, Indian boards must now consider a variety of 
interests in running the company. The legislative changes enhancing the 
responsibilities of directors to all stakeholders are bolstered by specific 
disclosure requirements and a “soft mandate” for CSR spending by the 
board.16 Both the U.K. and U.S. comparisons are useful in that many of 
the questions over the value of the enlightened shareholder value (ESV) 
model and benefit corporations, and whether each will achieve the goals 
of protecting stakeholder interests, are similar to questions that can be 
raised with respect to India’s corporate law reforms. 
There are also important differences between the reforms undertaken 
in India and those undertaken in the U.S. and U.K. Under the U.K.’s ESV 
model, shareholder interests arguably remain the top priority of boards. 
India, however, has recognized both shareholder and stakeholder interests 
“without necessarily indicating a preference to either.”17 India’s approach 
also differs from recent movements in the U.S. Much of the changes 
toward more socially responsible corporations in the U.S. have arisen from 
changes in business norms and practices rather than through legislative 
changes.18 This is in stark contrast to India’s recent corporate law reforms, 
which clearly mandate, both through company law legislation and through 
securities regulation, stakeholder rights, social responsibility, and board 
diversity, among other matters. Unlike the benefit corporation model in 
the U.S. that mandates broader board responsibilities for a select class of 
companies that have opted into the benefit corporation status, the move 
toward social responsibility and stakeholder duties in India applies to all 
publicly traded corporations and even to some large unlisted companies. 
While the Indian experiment has been hailed, like the benefit 
corporation experiment and ESV model, it is not clear that the lofty goals 
of the Companies Act will truly come to fruition. Certainly, there is a need 
for additional time to assess the Indian model’s aim and effectiveness. The 
Companies Act in India arguably does not push forward a new corporate 
purpose as far as it could. For example, the CSR provisions of the Act 
seem to equate CSR with corporate philanthropy rather than promote 
                                                     
 15. Daniel R. Fishel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1273 
(1982). 
 16. See Afsharipour & Rana, supra note 3, at 218. 
 17. Varottil, Evolution of Corporate Law, supra note 11, at 315. 
 18. See Johnson, Law and the History of Corporate Responsibilities, supra note 14, at 975. 
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strategic CSR with a holistic view of the impacts businesses have on 
society and the environment. Moreover, while directors must consider the 
interests of all stakeholders, many of the remedies provided under the 
Companies Act are given only to shareholders and not to all stakeholders. 
This comparative analysis of India’s move toward redefining 
corporate purpose proceeds as follows. Part I presents an overview of 
global debates over corporate purpose, drawing principally from the move 
toward the ESV model in the U.K. and benefit corporations in the U.S. 
This section briefly recounts the debates in both jurisdictions about 
whether the changes they have experienced will engender more socially 
responsible corporations. Part II then provides a condensed history of 
corporate law reforms in India and an overview of the legislative changes 
undertaken in the past decade. In Part II, this Article takes a broad 
approach toward analyzing the Act and argues that the various provisions 
of the Act demonstrate a move toward broader corporate purpose. In Part 
III, this Article argues that despite the goals of Indian law makers in 
passing the Companies Act, there are serious shortcomings in the law as it 
pushes toward a pluralistic stakeholder oriented purpose. Part III identifies 
several structural challenges that stand in the way of a move toward 
companies that truly are responsible to a wide variety of constituencies, 
including vagueness in the legislation, promoter-dominated ownership 
structures, ineffective institutional framework to support enforcement 
efforts by stakeholders generally, and weaknesses in the judiciary. These 
challenges suggest that India’s experiment with corporate purpose is one 
that is uncertain to succeed.  
I. GLOBAL DEBATES AND EXPERIMENTS WITH CORPORATE  
FORM AND PURPOSE 
A. The Shareholder–Stakeholder Debate 
The corporate purpose debate is a long-standing and fundamental 
question for corporate law around the world. The concept of corporate 
purpose is centrally tied to the function and duties of the corporate board. 
Whose interests must the board consider when making decisions? What 
does it mean to say that corporate directors owe a fiduciary duty to the 
corporation? Does the board’s fiduciary duty to the corporation mean that 
directors must focus on maximizing the wealth of shareholders even at the 
expense of other nonshareholder constituencies? To what extent can 
directors consider the interests of a broader group of stakeholders than just 
shareholders? 
Questions about corporate purpose and the role and responsibilities 
of directors in advancing the purpose of the corporation have arisen in 
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many different contexts and jurisdictions. In the U.S., for example, 
vigorous debates as to whether the board of directors should have duties 
only to shareholders or whether their duties should extend to stakeholders 
beyond shareholders go back to the early 1930s.19 Many noted scholars 
have argued that “shareholder value is the proper object of corporate law” 
because “focusing principally on the maximization of shareholder returns 
is, in general, the best means by which corporate law can serve the broader 
goal of advancing overall social welfare.”20 Other scholars argue that, in 
managing the company, the board must consider the interests of all 
stakeholders, such as employees, consumers, and the general public and 
must make decisions for the benefit of all stakeholders.21 Under the 
stakeholder view “the corporation has both public and private roles.”22 
Debates over the stakeholder versus shareholder-oriented models 
have occurred in other parts of the globe as well, with countries settling on 
different approaches. Many countries have more readily recognized the 
stakeholder approach than the shareholder oriented approach adopted in 
U.S. corporate law, particularly Delaware law.23 Moreover, international 
organizations have articulated the stakeholder approach in their various 
principles.24 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) principles of corporate governance, for example, 
state that boards should “take into account the interests of stakeholders” 
and should “take due regard of, and deal fairly with, other stakeholder 
                                                     
 19. See Lyman Johnson, Unsettledness in Delaware Corporate Law: Business Judgment Rule, 
Corporate Purpose, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 405, 435–37 (2013) [hereinafter Johnson, Unsettledness]. The 
famous debate was between Adolf Berle and Merrick Dodd who struggled with questions over the 
nature and purpose of the corporation. See A.A. Berle Jr., Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 
HARV. L. REV. 1049, 1060–69 (1931); E. Merrick Dodd Jr., For Whom are Corporate Managers 
Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145, 1153–57 (1932). Berle emphasized the fiduciary duties of 
managers toward shareholder-beneficiaries, while Dodd argued for broader obligations to a wider set 
of constituencies, including employees, consumers, and the public at large. In the 1970s, Milton 
Friedman argued for a strong shareholder wealth maximization goal. See Milton Friedman, The Social 
Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine), at 32. 
 20. REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND 
FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 28–29 (2d ed. 2009); see also Henry Hansmaan & Reinier Kraakman, The 
End of History for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441 (2001) (arguing that the best way to achieve 
aggregate social welfare is by focusing on shareholder wealth maximization). 
 21. See Johnson, Unsettledness, supra note 19, at 435–36. 
 22. Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: Corporate Governance Beyond the 
Shareholder–Stakeholder Divide, 36 J. CORP. L. 59, 71 (2010). 
 23. See id. at 72; Sanford M. Jacoby, Corporate Governance in Comparative Perspective: 
Prospects for Convergence, 22 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 5, 6 (2000); JAYATI SARKAR & SUBRATA 
SARKAR, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN INDIA 17–18 (2012). Outside of Delaware, many states have 
adopted constituency statutes that permit directors to consider the interests of a broad range of 
stakeholders when making decisions. See generally Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency 
Statutes and Employee Governance, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1227 (2004). 
 24. See SARKAR & SARKAR, supra note 23, at 17. 
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interests including those of employees, creditors, customers, suppliers and 
local communities.”25 
Even with respect to Delaware law, there are strong opinions 
supporting one position or the other, with fundamental ramifications for 
the purpose of the corporation.26 As Professor Lyman Johnson has noted, 
not only have scholars and jurists debated “what the purposes of the 
corporation should be,” but there is a fundamental dispute among these 
experts as to what “the law really is” on corporate purpose—in other 
words, “whether the law requires the maximization of shareholder wealth 
as the sole or predominant corporate purpose.”27 Recently, Chief Justice 
Strine of the Delaware Supreme Court proclaimed that “a clear-eyed look 
at the law of corporations in Delaware reveals that, within the limits of 
their discretion, directors must make stockholder welfare their sole end, 
and that other interests may be taken into consideration only as a means of 
promoting stockholder welfare.”28 On the other hand, other experts argue 
that shareholder wealth maximization is neither a legal requirement, even 
in Delaware, nor a desirable approach to corporate purpose.29 
B. Moving Away from Shareholder Wealth Maximization:  
U.K. and U.S. Examples 
In several countries, questions about corporate purpose have resulted 
in actual legislative changes. For the purposes of this Article, two of the 
most prominent changes are those undertaken in the U.K. and the U.S., the 
two jurisdictions that Indian corporate law often looks to for inspiration. 
In the U.K., legislators settled on the ESV model as adopted in 
Section 172 of the U.K. Companies Act.30 Section 172 defines the duties 
of directors as follows: 
                                                     
 25. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 51, 53 
(2015), http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-Governance-Principles-ENG.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
TT79-B98M]. 
 26. Compare Strine, supra note 13, at 763–68, with LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE 
MYTH: HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC 
30–31 (2012). 
 27. Lyman Johnson, Relating Fiduciary Duties to Corporate Personhood and Corporate 
Purpose, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON FIDUCIARY LAW 11 (D. Gordon Smith & Andrew Gold eds., 
forthcoming 2016); see also David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. 
L.J. 181 (2013). 
 28. Strine, supra note 13, at 768. 
 29. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 733, 736 (2005). 
 30. For a brief history of the purpose of Section 172, see Andrew R. Keay & Hao Zhang, An 
Analysis of Enlightened Shareholder Value in Light of Ex Post Opportunism and Incomplete Law,  
8 EUR. CO. & FIN. L. REV. 1, 6–9 (2011). 
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[A] director . . . must act . . . in good faith . . . to promote the success 
of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole, and in doing 
so have regard to . . . the likely consequences of any decision in the 
long term[;] the interest of the company’s employees[;] the need to 
foster the company’s business relationships with suppliers, customers 
and others[;] the impact of the company’s operations on the 
community and the environment[;] the desirability of the company 
maintaining a reputation for high standards of business conduct[;] 
and the need to act fairly as between members of the company.31 
Some scholars have argued that Section 172 makes clear that 
directors must, as a fundamental matter, advance and “prioritize” the 
interests of shareholders above all else.32 Thus, while corporate directors 
must “have regard” for the interests of nonshareholder constituencies, 
these interests “are relevant only insofar as they relate to the paramount 
goal of advancing the shareholders’ interests.”33 
Other commentators have argued that the ESV model “transcends the 
shareholder–stakeholder divide.”34 These scholars argue that under the 
ESV framework: 
[A]ttention to traditional “stakeholder” interests such as the effect of 
corporate operations on the environment, employees, or local 
communities, is seen as a means of generating long-term shareholder 
wealth and improving portfolio- and firm-level risk assessment. 
Enlightened shareholder value thus emphasizes the benefits to 
shareholders that can result from focusing corporate management on 
areas of shared shareholder and stakeholder concern while 
recognizing the very real challenges posed by the diversity of 
shareholder and stakeholder interests. At the same time, by asserting 
that shareholders should not achieve wealth through disregard for the 
impact of corporate decision-making on stakeholders, enlightened 
shareholder value also parts course to some degree from the standard 
shareholder wealth maximization conception of the corporate 
purpose.35 
Thus, the ESV framework goes beyond paying just lip service to 
stakeholder interests. Directors must, in good faith, consider the interests 
of stakeholders even if shareholder interests trump stakeholder interests. 
Accordingly, if the board makes decisions that seek to opportunistically 
benefit shareholders at the expense of other stakeholders, “then they might 
                                                     
 31. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 § 172 (Eng.) (emphasis added). 
 32. See CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD: 
THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER 34 (2013). 
 33. Id. at 44. 
 34. Harper Ho, supra note 22, at 62. 
 35. Id. 
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well be in breach because such action is not likely to benefit the company 
in the long term or accord with either ideas of the directors engaging in 
responsible behavior, as envisaged by the . . . principles underpinning the 
concept of ESV.”36 
In the U.S., the corporate purpose debate has undergone an important 
shift with the emergence of benefit corporations and other hybrid business 
entities.37 Of the various models that have proliferated, such as benefit 
corporations, low-profit limited liability companies (L3C), benefit LLCs, 
and social purpose corporations, the benefit corporation has gained the 
most steam across the U.S.38 To date, benefit corporation statutes have 
been adopted in more than thirty states, with proposed legislation being 
debated in a number of other states.39 
Benefit corporations have three fundamental characteristics 
addressing corporate purpose, board accountability, and reporting. More 
specifically, benefit corporations feature (1) a requirement that they must 
have a corporate purpose to create a material positive impact on society 
and the environment; (2) an expansion of the duties of directors to require 
consideration of nonfinancial stakeholders as well as the financial interests 
of shareholders; and (3) an obligation to report on their overall social and 
environmental performance using a comprehensive, credible, 
independent, and transparent third-party standard.40 
With respect to corporate purpose, benefit corporations allow the 
board “to advance both investor and noninvestor interests, in aid of 
pursuing a larger public benefit.”41 A “general public benefit” is defined 
in the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation as “[a] material positive 
impact on society and the environment, taken as a whole, assessed against 
a third-party standard, from the business and operations of a benefit 
                                                     
 36. Keay & Zhang, supra note 30, at 10. 
 37. For a comprehensive overview of the many different types of hybrid entities formed since 
the mid-2000s, see generally J. Haskell Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market, 75 MD. L. REV. 
541, 588 (2016) [hereinafter Murray, The Social Enterprise Law Market]. 
 38. The rapid expansion of the number of states with benefit corporation statutes is in large part 
due to the advocacy of B Lab and other proponents of the benefit corporation. See id. at 547. 
 39. About B Lab, BCORPORATION, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-b-corps/about-b-lab 
[https://perma.cc/U68G-79YL]; State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFITCORP., 
http://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status [https://perma.cc/GVX7-FHBF]. Delaware 
passed a benefit corporation statute that became effective on August 1, 2013. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, 
§§ 361–68 (2013). 
 40. WILLIAM H. CLARK JR. ET AL., BENEFIT CORP, THE NEED AND RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT 
CORPORATION: WHY IT IS THE LEGAL FORM THAT BEST ADDRESSES THE NEEDS OF SOCIAL 
ENTREPRENEURS, INVESTORS, AND, ULTIMATELY, THE PUBLIC 1 (Jan. 18, 2013), 
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Benefit_Corporation_White_Paper.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/33N5-PFEF] [hereinafter CLARK ET AL., WHITE PAPER]. 
 41. Lyman Johnson, Law and the History of Corporate Responsibilities: Corporate Governance, 
10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 974, 975 (2013). 
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corporation.”42 Thus, benefit corporations are designed to have “a 
corporate purpose broader than maximizing shareholder value” and to be 
responsible for maximizing “the benefits of [their] operations for all 
stakeholders, not just shareholders.”43 
There are several important legal distinctions that make the benefit 
corporation form attractive to both investors and directors who seek to 
achieve a corporate purpose that goes beyond shareholder wealth 
maximization. Benefit corporation directors owe a fiduciary duty and are 
legally obligated to make decisions that generate both a profit and a 
positive social or environmental impact.44 Accordingly, a business that is 
formed as a benefit corporation may be particularly attractive to certain 
investors and consumers. There is also an argument that directors of 
benefit corporations face a reduced risk of liability in the event of 
shareholder suits alleging that the company’s management is prioritizing 
other considerations over profits. Most benefit corporation statutes 
provide that “the consideration of all stakeholders shall not constitute a 
violation of the general standards for directors, which requires good faith, 
the care of an ordinarily prudent person, and the consideration of the best 
interests of the corporation.”45 
Proponents of benefit corporations also argue that the model provides 
greater transparency of the board’s decision-making process because the 
company must issue an annual benefit report that is available to the public 
and measures the public benefit against a third party standard that is 
“comprehensive, credible, independent and transparent.”46 This third party 
standard requirement has been described as an “essential” feature of the 
benefit corporation.47 Some scholars have lauded the potential of the 
benefit reporting requirement for developing and maintaining good 
corporate governance practices.48 
While there is much to be lauded in the benefit corporation 
movement, scholars have launched several criticisms against the benefit 
corporation. For example, several papers have argued that the 
accountability and transparency measures provide little comfort that 
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benefit corporations will in fact achieve their lofty goals.49 Others have 
argued that there may be potential unintended dangers with these new 
business entities. Scholars have noted that a potential drawback of the 
move toward benefit corporations is “the ‘ghettoization’ of corporate 
responsibility within benefit corporations” and other hybrid entities. 50 
These scholars argue that there is a risk of “even less attention to such 
concerns in the traditional business corporation.”51 “The argument is that, 
by resting on the false premise that managers of traditional corporations 
must prioritize profits above all else, the benefit corporation form 
undermines efforts to convince all corporate managers that CSR-driven 
activities are consistent with their fiduciary duties.”52 
Overall, the U.K. move toward the ESV model and the U.S. move 
toward hybrid entities have generated both hopes about their success in 
transforming the goals of corporate entities and skepticism about whether 
the lofty goals surrounding these changes will be fulfilled. Many of the 
debates with respect to both the ESV model in the U.K. and the move 
toward hybrid entities in the U.S. echo the debates that have arisen with 
respect to India’s experiment with corporate purpose. 
II. TOWARD A NEW CORPORATE PURPOSE IN INDIA’S CORPORATE LAWS 
Over the past decade, company and securities laws in India have 
undergone a major transformation. Starting with industry efforts in the late 
1990s, there has been a vigorous focus on reforming corporate governance 
practices in India.53 After the introduction of voluntary governance 
standards proposed by leading industry groups, both the Securities 
Exchange Board of India (SEBI)—the country’s primary capital markets 
regulatory authority—and the Ministry of Corporate Affairs (MCA) 
sprang into action to undertake more mandatory reforms. These efforts 
culminated in comprehensive revision of India’s primary corporate  
law—the Companies Act, 2013—as well as reform of the listing standards, 
which were later adopted as the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure 
Requirements) Regulations, 2015.54 
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A. History: Ambiguity Between Shareholder and  
Stakeholder View Points 
The history of India’s approach to the corporate purpose debate has 
been described as “ambiguous at best.”55 This ambiguity is due in part to 
India’s post-independence political engagement with socialism juxtaposed 
against the reality of corporate ownership of Indian firms.56 As in many 
other countries, controlling shareholders dominate corporate India.57 The 
Indian corporate landscape is characterized by groups of companies that 
are owned either by business families (i.e., the controlling shareholders or 
promoters)58 or by the state.59 This concentrated ownership structure has 
not changed despite years of significant economic and legal changes 
affecting businesses in India. For example, a recent study of ownership 
patterns for fifty large Indian firms found that ownership patterns 
“continue to be skewed toward controlling inside shareholders—a legacy 
of family-owned business ventures and state nationalization” and that “the 
trend seems to be moving away from outside share ownership.”60 
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Scholars have noted that “colonial law in India was unequivocal in 
its zeal to protect shareholders so as to enable companies to attract capital” 
and corporate law under the colonial period did not recognize  
nonshareholder interests.61 Nevertheless, with India’s post-independence 
move toward socialist policies, Indian corporate law began to recognize 
the interests of nonshareholder stakeholders, including employees and 
creditors.62 
Corporate purpose in India moved toward a more  
shareholder-oriented approach in the first decade after economic 
liberalization. A somewhat ambiguous shareholder-oriented corporate 
purpose is reflected in the first significant corporate governance initiatives 
undertaken in India. For example, in 1998 the Confederation of Indian 
Industry (CII)—one of India’s largest industry and business 
associations63—released its Voluntary Code of Corporate Governance 
(Desirable Corporate Governance: A Code) for listed companies. The CII 
Code states that the objective of good corporate governance is to maximize 
long-term shareholder value and to “limit the claimants to shareholders 
and various types of creditors.”64 Nevertheless, the CII Code does not fully 
ignore stakeholders and declares that “this objective follows from a 
premise that, in well performing capital and financial markets, whatever 
maximises shareholder value must necessarily maximise corporate 
prosperity, and best satisfy the claims of creditors, employees, 
shareholders, and the State.”65 
The focus on shareholders, with only a nod to stakeholders, 
continued in the early government-commissioned reports on corporate 
governance. Formed by SEBI in 1999 to help develop corporate 
governance standards for publicly listed companies, the Committee on 
Corporate Governance (the Birla Committee) issued a report that 
decidedly saw shareholder interests as the focus of corporate purpose.66 
According to the Birla Committee, shareholders “are the raison de etre for 
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corporate governance.”67 The committee did, however, exclaim that, while 
it viewed the goal of corporate governance to be the “enhancement of 
shareholder value,” the company must “strike a balance at all times 
between the need to enhance shareholders’ wealth whilst not in any way 
being detrimental to the interests of the other stakeholders in the 
company.”68 
Other reports in the 2000s similarly presented somewhat conflicting 
pronouncements regarding corporate purpose. With respect to the 
government-commissioned reports, scholars have criticized the lack of 
any significant effort to determine “who should qualify as a legitimate 
stakeholder” or to discuss “the relative weights to be assigned to the 
different stakeholders, or to specify, in the recommendations, mechanisms 
for ‘equitable distribution’ among the variety of stakeholders.”69 For 
example, SEBI’s 2003 Murthy Committee focused on shareholders as the 
“true owners” of the corporation and stated that good corporate 
governance regimes display “a high degree of priority placed on the 
interests of shareholders.”70 Much like the Birla Committee, the Murthy 
Committee briefly touched upon the interests of stakeholders by stating 
that a corporation must be “fair and transparent to its stakeholders” and 
that, in being accountable to shareholders, boards must operate the 
company “for the benefit of society as a whole.”71 Neither the Birla nor 
the Murthy Committees clearly defined who encompassed stakeholders. 
Despite some recognition of stakeholder interests from SEBI 
Committees, India’s initial corporate governance reforms, enacted via 
Clause 49 of the Listing Agreement, were shareholder focused.72 The 
focus on shareholders was not surprising given the vast shortcomings in 
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investor rights and disclosure in Indian corporate law prior to enactment 
of Clause 49.73 
In addition to committees formed by SEBI, the MCA also formed 
several committees to address potential amendments of the Companies 
Act. Most significantly, in December 2004 the MCA convened the Irani 
Committee to evaluate the Companies Act with a focus on combining 
internationally accepted best practices in corporate governance with the 
particular needs of the growing Indian economy.74 The Irani Committee 
expressed that the best approach to corporate governance in India would 
be to construct a single framework of governance provisions for all 
companies, requiring them to comply with a uniform set of rules.75 The 
report of the Irani Committee made a few passing references to the 
interests of other stakeholders, but its focus was clearly on shareholders, 
with an emphasis on proposals to augment shareholder rights, especially 
the rights of minority shareholders.76 The Irani report has been described 
as “business friendly” and is aimed at “attracting greater investment” into 
Indian firms.77 
India began to more clearly move toward a stakeholder-oriented 
approach with debates over various versions of the Companies Bill that 
arose after the Satyam corporate scandal came to light in 2009.78 A 
massive accounting fraud totaling more than $1 billion that involved one 
of India’s then-leading technology companies as well as the Indian 
affiliate of leading accounting firm PricewaterhouseCoopers; the Satyam 
scandal has been billed as India’s Enron.79 The Satyam scandal served as 
a catalyst for the Indian government to rethink the corporate governance, 
disclosure, accountability, and enforcement mechanisms in place.80 In a 
detailed account of corporate law in post-colonial India, Professor 
Umakanth Varottil notes that The Companies Bill, 2009 (2009 bill) was 
“shareholder-oriented, in that directors owed duties to carry on the 
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business of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole.”81 The 
2009 bill made little reference to stakeholders other than a requirement for 
certain companies to have a Stakeholder Relationship Committee to 
“resolve the grievances of stakeholders” without defining who would 
qualify as a stakeholder.82 The Parliamentary Standing Committee on 
Finance, which reviewed the 2009 bill in a detailed report, abandoned this 
shareholder-oriented approach.83 The Standing Committee instead 
“insisted on a broader stakeholder approach to corporate law,” perhaps to 
address political pressures and criticism of the corporate sector that had 
arisen after the Satyam scandal.84 The Standing Committee’s review also 
included a discussion of the extent of CSR being undertaken by Indian 
firms and the need for a comprehensive CSR policy.85 
In addition to the viewpoints of the Standing Committee regarding 
CSR, the Indian government made other efforts to strengthen and 
encourage CSR activities by Indian businesses. For example, in late 2009, 
the MCA proposed the Corporate Social Responsibility Voluntary 
Guidelines, which promoted the stakeholder-oriented triple bottom line 
approach articulated in international CSR standards.86 Moreover, in 2011, 
the MCA issued the National Voluntary Guidelines on Social, 
Environmental & Economic Responsibilities of Business (ESG 
Guidelines) to establish concrete measures to be voluntarily adopted by 
companies to address interests of various stakeholders such as employees, 
customers, and the environment.87 
Following the initial report of the Standing Committee, the resulting 
Companies Bill (2011) included substantial changes related to corporate 
governance matters, including a greater emphasis on stakeholders, as well 
as on CSR. Over the next several years, the MCA fluctuated between 
imposing mandatory CSR requirements into the Companies Bill and 
adopting CSR recommendations with a “comply-or-explain” approach, 
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eventually settling on a compromise approach.88 In part to address some 
of the concerns raised regarding the Companies Bill (2011) and the 
debates, which ensued following the Satyam scandal, in 2012 the MCA 
created the Godrej Committee to formulate a comprehensive policy 
framework with practical suggestions to guide corporate governance in 
India.89 
The move toward a redefined corporate purpose was further 
strengthened by the pronouncement of the 2013 Godrej Committee.90 The 
Godrej Report enumerated a set of recommendations and general 
principles that aimed to strengthen Indian corporate governance by having 
these recommendations eventually adopted into law.91 The Godrej Report 
explicitly recognized that corporate purpose is not about shareholder 
wealth maximization, at least in the short term, stating the following: 
[I]t is now more explicitly accepted that the shareholders have 
responsibilities towards other stakeholders, and in particular the host 
communities within which the company operates. Failure to respect 
these obligations is likely to provoke negative interventions from 
government or negative market reactions in the long term. If the 
interests of all the relevant stakeholders are balanced, good corporate 
governance should maximize the shareholders’ wealth and maintain 
the company’s surrounding relationships. Therefore managers need 
to satisfy and balance the interests of a wider set of stakeholders, not 
simply the shareholders. Fair and balanced stakeholders’ perspective 
results in long-term shareholder maximization value. Good corporate 
governance is the reconciliation of otherwise (possibly) diverging 
interests.92 
Unlike prior government reports, the Godrej Report was more 
specific with respect to potential stakeholders, identifying “creditors, 
employees, and business partners, such as suppliers and the local 
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community” as stakeholders.93 The Godrej Report also argued for greater 
diversity in board composition to have a board that better addresses the 
perspective of a variety of stakeholders.94 
B. Reexamining Corporate Purpose? The Companies Act, 2013  
and SEBI’s Listing Regulations 
The process of reforming India’s corporate and securities laws, 
particularly after the Satyam fiasco, involved significant debate about 
corporate power and the role of the corporation in Indian society. 
Moreover, there was a vigorous debate about the need for an explicit 
public/private partnership in pushing India toward greater economic 
development and equality. 
After years of committee reports and discarded bills, the Companies 
Act, 2013 was finally passed in August 2013.95 In line with the progression 
of earlier debates and reports—in particular reviews by the Standing 
Committee and the 2013 Godrej Report—the Companies Act no longer 
articulates shareholder wealth maximization principles. Instead, the Act 
envisions a significant cultural change for Indian firms, with a purpose that 
goes beyond shareholder wealth maximization. Arguably, firms in India 
are now a kind of “hybrid entity” that must be run for the benefit of 
shareholders while at the same time considering the best interests of the 
company’s “employees, the shareholders, the community, and . . . the 
protection of [the] environment.”96 
Several provisions of the Act, when viewed together, eschew 
shareholder wealth maximization in favor of a balance between the 
interests of stakeholders and shareholders. These provisions include 
specific statutory articulation of the board’s fiduciary duties, board 
responsibilities for CSR, enhanced disclosure and reporting requirements 
that extend beyond matters relevant to shareholder wealth, and, in some 
cases, board engagement with stakeholders beyond shareholders. 
After passage of the 2013 Act, in 2015 SEBI amended its Listing 
Regulations.97 The SEBI Listing Regulations reinforce the stakeholder 
viewpoint encompassed in the Act, particularly with respect to large 
companies. 
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1. Board Fiduciary Duties and Independent Director Responsibilities 
Unlike the 1956 Companies Act, the 2013 Act articulates broader 
board responsibilities, including a sweeping provision codifying the duties 
of directors as well as a specific code of conduct for independent directors, 
which supplements the provisions on director duties and responsibilities. 
Section 166 of the Companies Act, 2013 provides that directors must 
“act in good faith in order to promote the objects of the company for the 
benefit of its members as a whole, and in the best interests of the company, 
its employees, the shareholders, the community and for the protection of 
environment.”98 In reviewing the legislative history of Section 166, 
scholars have argued that the language of the section was intentionally 
drafted “to cast a positive duty on directors, and was not merely an 
enabling provision.”99 Section 166 appears to imply that the company has 
a wide array of stakeholders, including employees, shareholders, the 
community, and the environment. 
Section 166’s broad vision of directors’ duties to stakeholders is 
reinforced in the Act’s Code for Independent Directors. The Code provides 
that independent directors must “safeguard the interests of all 
stakeholders, . . . [and] balance the conflicting interest of the 
stakeholders.”100 Independent directors are charged with assisting in 
“protecting the legitimate interests of the company, its shareholders and 
its employees.”101 One of the challenges with both provisions is that there 
remains vagueness as to the definition of stakeholders. Moreover, there 
has been little guidance on how directors should go about balancing the 
conflicting interests of stakeholders and how such balancing must work 
when there are conflicts between shareholder and other stakeholder 
interests.102 
2. The Companies Act’s CSR Provisions 
One of the most significant provisions of the Companies Act, 2013 
is Section 135, which imposes a requirement for companies to have a CSR 
committee and adopt a “comply-or-explain” approach toward mandatory 
CSR spending along with mandatory CSR reporting.103 The reach of the 
CSR clause is expected to be vast, with some experts estimating that at 
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least 6,000 Indian companies will be required to comply with the CSR 
provisions of the Companies Act.104 
More specifically, Section 135 of the Act establishes that companies 
with (1) a net worth of Rupees 500 crore or more (approx. $81 million), 
(2) turnover of Rupees 1,000 crore or more (approx. $162 million), or (3) 
net profit of Rupees 5 crore or more (approx. $811,400) during any 
financial year must have a board-level CSR committee, with three or more 
directors (one of them an independent director), to create and implement 
a CSR policy.105 Such companies must spend 2% of their average profit in 
the previous three years on CSR activities or explain their failure to do 
so.106 If a company does not have adequate profit or is not in a position to 
spend the prescribed amount on CSR, the regulation requires the directors 
to provide a disclosure and give suitable reasons in their annual report.107 
The Companies Act also includes a detailed schedule of CSR activities 
that companies “may” undertake.108 In addition, the final rules adopted by 
the MCA to implement Section 135 of the Act both define the term “CSR” 
and expand the scope of permissible CSR activities.109 The final rules 
provide significant limitations regarding what counts as CSR, excluding 
the following from CSR activities and expenditures: (1) expenditures 
incurred in undertaking normal course of business; (2) CSR activities 
undertaken outside of India; (3) projects, programs, or activities meant 
exclusively for employees and their families; and (4) direct or indirect 
contributions to any political party.110 
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3. Board’s Stakeholder Relationship Committee 
Under both the Companies Act and the SEBI Listing Regulations, 
certain Indian firms must have a stakeholder relationship committee. 
Under Section 178(5) of the Companies Act, a company that has more than 
one thousand shareholders, bond-holders, deposit-holders, and other 
security holders must have a stakeholder relationship committee as part of 
the board.111 Under the Act, the stakeholder relationship committee is 
charged with considering and resolving grievances from financial 
stakeholders only; no mention is made of other stakeholders.112 Similarly, 
SEBI also requires listed entities to have a stakeholder relationship 
committee to “consider and resolve the grievances of the security holders 
of the listed entity including complaints related to transfer of shares, non-
receipt of annual report and non-receipt of declared dividends.”113 
With respect to both the Companies Act and the SEBI Listing 
Regulations, the constituency of stakeholders identified in the legislation 
causes some ambiguity as to who the stakeholders are. Despite the use of 
the term “stakeholders,” the definition of stakeholders with respect to this 
committee is quite limited and only includes financial stakeholders.114 
Other sections of the Act and the SEBI Listing Regulations, however, 
imply a very broad set of stakeholders.115 Large companies in India have 
seized upon the narrow definition of stakeholders in the Act and have 
charged their stakeholder relationship committees with only reviewing and 
redressing shareholder and investor grievances.116 
4. SEBI Listing Regulations: Reinforcing a Broader Corporate Purpose 
In November 2014, SEBI announced that it intended to convert the 
Listing Agreement into the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure 
Requirements) Regulations to provide a comprehensive framework 
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Company.”). 
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governing listed securities with the intent “to consolidate and streamline 
the provisions of existing Listing Agreements, thereby ensuring better 
enforceability.”117 
In addition to shareholder rights, the SEBI Listing Regulations 
recognize a role for stakeholders in corporate governance, stating that: 
(i) The listed entity shall respect the rights of stakeholders that are 
established by law or through mutual agreements. 
(ii) Stakeholders shall have the opportunity to obtain effective redress 
for violation of their rights. 
(iii) Stakeholders shall have access to relevant, sufficient and reliable 
information on a timely and regular basis to enable them to 
participate in corporate governance process. 
(iv) The listed entity shall devise an effective whistle blower 
mechanism enabling stakeholders, including individual employees 
and their representative bodies, to freely communicate their concerns 
about illegal or unethical practices.118 
The SEBI Listing Regulations also address stakeholder concerns by 
detailing the accountability of the board of directors and the company’s 
disclosure obligations. The regulations provide that  
[t]he board of directors and senior management shall conduct 
themselves so as to meet the expectations of operational transparency 
to stakeholders while at the same time maintaining confidentiality of 
information in order to foster a culture of good decision-making. . . . 
[and,] [t]he board of directors shall maintain high ethical standards 
and shall take into account the interests of stakeholders.119  
The SEBI Listing Regulations also include significant additional reporting 
obligations for large entities. The top 100 listed entities must file a 
business responsibility report describing the initiatives taken by them from 
an environmental, social, and governance perspective.120 
                                                     
 117. Press Release, Securities and Exchange Board of India, SEBI Board Meeting (PR No. 
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5. Changes in Disclosure Policy and Practices 
An important element of the Companies Act and the SEBI Listing 
Regulations is the move toward significant additional disclosures to be 
provided by the company and the board. Experts have stated that 
“transparency with self-reporting and disclosure is the foundation of [the] 
new Companies Act, 2013.”121 Section 134 of the Companies Act outlines 
a long list of details that must be included in annual reports by the board 
of directors.122 For example, Section 134(6)(o) requires that board reports 
include “the details about the policy developed and implemented by the 
company on corporate social responsibility initiatives taken during the 
year.”123 With respect to CSR, the Companies Act requires that the board 
of the company must, after taking into account the recommendations made 
by the CSR committee, approve the CSR policy for the company, disclose 
its contents in the board report, and publish the details on the company’s 
official website.124 In addition, directors must issue a responsibility 
statement with significant information on internal and financial controls, 
including whether they “had devised proper systems to ensure compliance 
with the provisions of all applicable laws and that such systems were 
adequate and operating effectively.”125 
Presently, it is not clear whether the extensive disclosure 
requirements of the Act and the SEBI Listing Regulations will achieve 
their stated goal. Per a 2016 study by Deloitte, many companies have 
failed to include some of the disclosures required by the Act.126 It is also 
still too soon to determine whether stakeholders will use the disclosures 
given by companies to pressure for greater accountability in corporate 
practices. 
Nevertheless, disclosure can be a useful tool for non-government 
organizations, employees, and other stakeholder groups, who hope to hold 
the firm responsible to stakeholders beyond shareholders. Disclosure can 
also be used by institutional players, such as proxy advisory firms, which 
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have recently gained some prominence in India.127 There are several very 
active proxy advisory firms in India, which not only analyze corporate 
proposals and provide voting recommendations but also focus on 
corporate governance trends in general, including matters related to 
CSR.128 Other analysts can also use the more robust disclosure regime to 
ensure greater accountability for corporate boards.129 One potentially 
useful institution that can be a powerful agent for furthering the legislative 
moves in India would be an independent and unbiased third party entity, 
such as B Lab, to create assessment and analytical tools to help boards 
better assess their company’s impact on various stakeholders.130 
III. EVALUATING INDIA’S NEW CORPORATE PURPOSE FRAMEWORK 
While India has moved toward redefining corporate purpose with a 
stakeholder approach, whether this move will be effectively implemented 
is subject to many questions. This section addresses some of the questions 
that arise with respect to India’s legislative reforms, including definitional 
problems with the law itself, issues with potential enforcement, and 
challenges related to the closed ownership structure of Indian firms. 
Despite these challenges, there is hope that stakeholders can utilize the 
tools offered by the new legislation to nudge Indian boards toward a 
stakeholder approach. 
A. Who are the Stakeholders and What Should Directors Do to Balance 
the Interests of Various Stakeholders? 
Several challenges with India’s new approach to corporate purpose 
begin with the law itself. One of the concerns with the legislative changes 
is that there remains much confusion in both the Companies Act and the 
SEBI Listing Regulations with respect to the language and mandates 
placed in legislation. A second concern with the legislation is a more 
fundamental concern that a more diffuse duty as espoused in the Act may 
make directors’ fiduciary duty of little value. 
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The language of stakeholder duties in the Act and the SEBI Listing 
Regulations fails to make clear the universe of potential stakeholders. 
While Section 166 appears to indicate a broad universe of stakeholders, 
one could read the provisions of the Code for Independent Directors as 
envisioning a narrower group of stakeholders limited to employees and 
minority shareholders.131 But, Section 166 envisions the community and 
the environment as stakeholders, so are future generations affected by 
corporate activity stakeholders? 
There is also a significant lack of clarity and specific standards for 
directors charged with balancing the conflicting “interests” of 
stakeholders.132 Board members may rightly ask if “interests” are broader 
than “rights” and if so, how does a board go about identifying “interests” 
of stakeholders? Both the Act and the SEBI Listing Regulations are also 
vague as to how directors should weigh the interests of varying groups of 
stakeholders. In terms of “balancing” these competing interests, how does 
a board develop a consistent method to measure and balance these 
interests? In measuring stakeholder interests, how does a board measure 
the value of other forms of life that are present in the environment and 
affected by the activities of a firm? How does the board balance its 
responsibilities when there are conflicts between the interests of different 
stakeholders? The lack of guidance regarding how directors should go 
about considering the interests of stakeholders is in contrast with the 
clearer ESV approach in the U.K. where directors must “prioritize” the 
interests of shareholders above other stakeholders.133 
A more fundamental concern with the stakeholder-oriented model 
espoused in the Act and SEBI Listing Regulations is the overly permissive 
or deferential nature of this model. If the board is accountable to everyone, 
could it then not be accountable to anyone? Scholars have raised the 
concern that the broad wording of Section 166 of the Act provides 
“directors with substantial (and somewhat untrammeled) discretion” that 
would allow them “to foster their own self-interest, and leave them with 
little accountability to anyone.”134 
The criticisms about the universe of stakeholders and the lack of 
guidance the law provides to directors in making corporate decisions or to 
courts evaluating board actions mirrors criticisms levied against the 
benefit corporation model in the U.S. Corporate law experts in the U.S. 
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have criticized various aspects of the benefit corporation form.135 Criticism 
of the benefit corporation form includes concerns that “the ‘general public 
benefit’ concept is too vague, provides insufficient guidance to directors 
when they face zero-sum games, and should be supplemented to require 
the prioritization of the interests, or at least the identification of the benefit 
corporation’s primary interest.”136 Others have expressed concern that the 
broad discretion afforded to directors by benefit corporation statutes may 
allow directors to favor their own interests.137 
Given the relative youth of the benefit corporation model and India’s 
recent move toward a stakeholder-oriented purpose, debates about these 
models and whether they will be successful will undoubtedly continue. 
B. Enforcement Challenges 
With respect to many legal reforms, particularly in the realm of 
corporate law, India has faced significant problems with enforcement and 
implementation. For example, in enforcing the vast corporate governance 
reforms contemplated by Clause 49, SEBI fell short, and compliance 
inadequacies were rampant, particularly for companies where the 
government was the controlling shareholder.138 Further, courts in India 
have not played a significant role in the enforcement of modern corporate 
law.139 Remedies for shareholders, such as derivative actions, have not 
played any real role in enforcing directors’ fiduciary duties.140 Moreover, 
litigation in India is notoriously delayed; it takes a significant amount of 
time, approximately fifteen years, for final resolution of a case.141 
According to some reports at the end of 2013, more than 31 million cases 
were pending in various courts, all the way up to the Supreme Court.142 By 
some calculations, “[i]f the nation’s judges attacked their backlog 
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nonstop—with no breaks for eating or sleeping—and closed 100 cases 
every hour, it would take more than 35 years to catch up.”143  
In addition to weaknesses in regulatory and judicial enforcement, the 
Companies Act as it stands provides little opportunity for nonshareholder 
stakeholders to bring an enforcement action to protect their interests. For 
example, there appears to be little opportunity for stakeholders to find a 
remedy in the courts for director violations of the board’s duty to consider 
the interests of stakeholders under Section 166 of the Companies Act.144 
While the Companies Act contemplated the establishment of a National 
Company Law Tribunal to address corporate law disputes, including a 
newly introduced class action remedy, a close reading of the statute 
suggests that “the class action remedy is unavailable to stakeholders in 
ensuring the enforcement of directors’ duties of which they are the 
ultimate beneficiaries.”145 
The lack of enforcement remedies for stakeholders under the 
Companies Act mirrors the lack of specific remedies for nonshareholders 
in both the U.K. and the U.S. models. In the U.K., even under the ESV 
model, directors’ duties are owed only to the company, and stakeholders 
cannot seek remedies against directors.146 In the U.S. benefit corporation 
form, only shareholders, and not the other stakeholders, may bring a 
benefit enforcement proceeding.147 
Other sections of the Companies Act relating to stakeholder interests, 
such as the CSR provision, similarly suffer from enforcement weaknesses. 
Under the law, the penalties for companies that fail to report and spend 
adequately on CSR activities are rather minimal. For companies that fail 
to spend 2% of their profits on CSR activities, Section 135 of the Act does 
not contemplate any enforcement.148 There is potential enforcement of the 
failure to adequately report on CSR activities under Section 134(8) of the 
Act.149 However, the enforcement process is only in the early stages 
because the CSR requirement only came into effect for financial year  
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2014–2015.150 In addition, a 2015 report of a committee formed by the 
MCA suggested that “leniency may be shown against the companies for 
non-compliance in [the] initial two/three years to enable them to graduate 
to a culture of compliance. This is being recommended because [the] 
initial three years will be a period of learning for all the stakeholders.”151 
Moreover, the MCA has publicly stated that “the main thrust and spirit of 
the law is not to monitor but generate a conductive environment for 
enabling the corporates to conduct themselves in a socially responsible 
manner.”152 
Whether the MCA’s vision for creating an atmosphere of greater 
social responsibility will come to fruition will depend in part on the quality 
of the CSR reporting done by companies. Proponents of the CSR 
provisions of the Companies Act argue that this type of CSR disclosure 
can “enable dissemination of information to society about the value 
generated by the company’s activities and will facilitate monitoring.”153 
With respect to benefit corporations in the U.S., proponents similarly 
argue that the requirements of the benefit corporation form increase 
transparency through the requirement of annual benefit reports.154 
Moreover, some scholars have argued that annual benefit reporting serves 
a potentially powerful function that would allow for boards and the entity 
to reflect upon the purpose of the company and the decision-making 
processes undertaken.155 With respect to CSR reporting by Indian firms, it 
may be still too early to have a definitive view as to the value of these 
reports, although a recent study has found that early reports do not provide 
much specific information to stakeholders.156 
Despite the lack of effective enforcement or legal remedies for 
stakeholders, there is also a possibility that the amended duties and 
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responsibilities espoused in the Companies Act will affect board function 
and decision-making. Many boards consider reputational and relationship 
issues significant even without the threat of a lawsuit. Formal judicial 
enforcement is not the sole method that can be used by various 
stakeholders. Around the world companies have developed deep 
relationships with various stakeholders and have engaged significantly 
with the interests of their stakeholders.157 It may be that the broadened 
fiduciary duties of directors under the Companies Act may propel Indian 
boards and stakeholders to approach each other in new and innovative 
ways. 
C. The Continuing Dominance of Promoters and Its Implications  
for Corporate Purpose 
An important question about the efficacy of India’s redefined 
corporate purpose is whether a broad mandate to consider and balance the 
interests of all stakeholders is possible in a system where firms are 
primarily dominated by controlling shareholders of business families or 
the state. Given the broadly worded provisions of the Act, which give 
much discretion to the board, this concern is particularly acute because 
even independent directors in India often view their position with an 
allegiance to the controlling shareholder.158 Thus, directors could, within 
their discretion, place a priority on the interests of promoters over other 
shareholders or stakeholders. 
Even if directors want to take into consideration the interests of  
nonshareholders, the entire system of director nomination and election in 
India is subject to the voting power of controlling shareholders. Under the 
Act, as well as under the SEBI Listing Regulations, publicly listed 
companies must have a nomination and remuneration committee (the 
NRC), which is to consist of three or more non-executive directors out of 
which not less than one half must be independent directors.159 The 
chairperson of the company, whether an executive or non-executive 
director, may be appointed as a member of the NRC but is not permitted 
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to chair the committee.160 While the NRC must be composed of a majority 
independent directors, experts have argued that the committee might be 
compelled to function in the shadow of an ultimate shareholder decision 
(with controlling shareholder influence).161 The regulatory framework in 
India does not prohibit controlling shareholders from being on the NRC. 
While such shareholder presence on the NRC could potentially provide an 
opportunity for controlling shareholders to ensure that the NRC adheres to 
best practices, it may also mean that directors will feel an allegiance to the 
controlling shareholder and may be reluctant to oppose any corporate 
actions proposed by such shareholder. Moreover, controlling shareholders 
may also deliberately work to pack the board with people whose skill sets 
do not match the company requirements so that they are not able to 
question the management in an effective manner. 
Despite concerns with the controlling shareholder model, there are 
arguments that a broader corporate purpose and controlling shareholder 
dominance may not be at odds. Scholars have argued that companies with 
controlling shareholders may be better at protecting the interests of 
stakeholders as they are motivated by the long-term interests of the 
company more so than widely held firms with short-term shareholders.162 
Examples abound of very successful controlled firms with broad 
stakeholder engagement; most famously, the Tata Group in India which is 
world renowned for its commitment to the community and other 
stakeholders.163 Further, some scholars have argued that it is possible that 
the incentives of controlling shareholders are better tied with the interests 
of the company.164 
CONCLUSION 
India has undertaken a vast experiment with corporate purpose, one 
whose outcome is, at best, unclear. Overall, the reforms under the 
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Companies Act and the SEBI Listing Regulations suggest (although they 
do not guarantee) that India intends to transform corporate purpose beyond 
the ESV model adopted in the U.K. Moreover, unlike the U.S. move to 
allow for benefit corporations, India’s transformation of corporate purpose 
does not apply to a mere subset of entities, but instead contemplates an 
overhaul of corporate vision in Indian firms. Nevertheless, there is reason 
to doubt that the specific legal provisions provided by the Companies Act 
and the SEBI Listing Regulations will in fact lead to substantive 
“structural change” given the various forces and institutions that may stand 
in the way of redefining the purpose of the Indian firm.165 
There is much potential in India’s model toward redefining the 
purpose of the corporation beyond shareholder wealth maximization. 
India’s move toward a pluralistic model that recognizes stakeholder 
interests is a powerful vision that has the potential to significantly 
transform corporate and board practices in India and beyond. Whether this 
transformation will take place depends on the will of the various 
stakeholders involved, including boards, shareholders, employees, and 
civil society organizations, as well as on institutional players such as proxy 
advisory firms and independent and unbiased third parties that can help 
facilitate and support the board in achieving the broader purpose 
envisioned by India’s reforms. 
                                                     
 165. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF 
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 275 (1994) (stating that “[l]egal change alone might not lead to 
structural change” in long-standing ownership and governance structures given economic, political, 
and institutional forces that favor the status quo). 
